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Straddling the contradictions.





This paper aims to explore some of the tensions and dilemmas of combining different qualitative methods in a single study. The author presents a sample of results from recent research exploring the role of attachment status in counselling psychologists’ experiences of personal therapy. Participants were interviewed twice: once using Main and Goldwyn’s (1990) Adult Attachment Interview (AAI), coded for reflective function (Fonagy et al, 1998); and subsequently using a semi-structured interview format, analysed via interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), to explore experiences of personal therapy. Meshing results from both sets of data raised a dilemma about whether to foreground interpretations drawing on attachment theory or phenomenological, experience-near descriptions of personal therapy. Drawing on neo-pragmatist philosophies, the author considers how participants’ accounts can be seen to interrogate the professional view that personal therapy is an indispensable part of psychotherapeutic training. The value of retaining a pluralist perspective within qualitative research is recommended.  





'Life involves maintaining oneself between contradictions that can't be solved by analysis (William Empson).

In ‘Seven types of ambiguity’, a remarkable series of essays on literary criticism written as an undergraduate, Empson claims that we should not waste time trying to resolve the contradictions in our lives, but rather straddle them by formulating them as clearly and incisively as possible. Ambiguity, for Empson (1949), involves a ‘fundamental situation, … in that a word, or a grammatical structure, is effective in several ways at once’ (p. 2); and it is the capacity of the reader to hold in mind the many competing alternative meanings within a text that he sees as constitutive of the moral value and emotional richness of literature and poetry.

I want to use Empson as a touchstone for thinking about the importance of straddling the contradictions in pluralist methodologies within social science research.  Methodological pluralism has commonly been taken to mean mixing quantitative and qualitative methodologies (eg.  Bryman, 2004; Robson, 2002; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) where, in contrast to earlier notions of ‘incommensurability’ (Howe 1988), such diversity is now seen as valuable (Barker and Pistrang 2005; Burke Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Pluralism in qualitative approaches – mixing different qualitative methods within a single study – has to date been far less common, with some similarly rejecting the possibility of ‘method slurring' (Baker et al. 1992) on the grounds of incompatible philosophies and epistemologies.

Managing the tensions and dilemmas of widely differing qualitative approaches became of central importance recently when I carried out a study with a colleague (Rizq and Target 2010a, 2010b) using both interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA; Smith, 1996) and a psychoanalytically-informed type of discursive analysis (Adult Attachment Interviews; Main et al, 1985).  IPA is a qualitative research methodology now widely used by psychologists in the UK. It is a form of phenomenological inquiry which aims to explore, in detail, an individual’s personal experience or lifeworld. Philosophically, IPA is grounded in a rejection of the traditional Cartesian split between self and other, and instead adopts the Heideggerian view of person-in-context who can only be understood as a function of his or her involvement in the world. IPA is also rooted in symbolic interactionism, (Blume, 1962) and the hermeneutic tradition, recognising that, whilst there is no such thing as a ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel, 1986), direct access to another’s world is possible through a cautious process of interpretation, in which the researcher’s own views, lifeworld and personal background are necessarily implicated. Larkin, Watts and Clifton (2006) point out that:

‘In this Heideggerian sense, the central goal of phenomenology is to approach and deal with any object of our attention in  that it is allowed maximal opportunity to show itself ‘as itself’. Another way of putting this is that the phenomenologist aims to reveal any subject-matter on its own terms (ie, not according to the imposition of any preconceived set of assumptions and expectations). It is nonetheless, inevitable that we will fall short of this target, for being a ‘person-in-context (and hence an observer, indelibly situated within the meaningful world that we observe) we can never fully escape the ‘preconceptions’ that our world brings with it.  But this should not discourage us from making the attempt’. (p. 108).

Smith (1996) originally distinguished IPA from discourse analysis (DA; Potter and Wetherall, 1987) which, rather than being concerned with the meaning that people ascribe to events and experiences, instead focuses on the role and function of language in structuring experience. Whilst IPA privileges the attitudes, beliefs, feelings and intentions of participants, DA typically focuses on the context and interactive function of the language participants employ in certain contexts; in this way it challenges the premise that verbal reports easily map on to underlying cognitions.





The literature on personal therapy in psychotherapeutic training is predominantly quantitative, and overall provides an overwhelmingly positive view of its personal and professional value to clinicians (Orlinsky et al, 2005). The very small number of qualitative studies investigating practitioners’ views of their own therapy (Macran et al, 1999; Wiseman and Shefler 1999; Grimmer and Tribe, 2000; Murphy, 2005; Rake and Paley, 2009) have tended to provide a similarly affirmative perspective. In an initial IPA study (Rizq and Target 2008a, Rizq and Target 2008b), we interviewed senior counselling psychologists about their experiences of personal therapy in training. During interviews, we found that many participants spontaneously referred to a reflective part of themselves that seemed to be embedded within the need to understand and resolve difficulties within the family or their immediate social environment.  Many of these events were traumatic, involving early deaths of caregivers or siblings, or disruptive or unhappy family relationships; others described an acutely painful sense of feeling lost or not belonging within the family. Participants all seemed to be exceptionally aware of these early attachment-related events that were signposted as crucial in the genesis and development of a reflective aspect of the self that they later amplified in their personal therapy and deemed crucial in their clinical work.

It was the unexpected emergence of this material that led us in a subsequent study (Rizq and Target 2010a, Rizq and Target 2010b) to interview more recently qualified counselling psychologists, and to explore in more detail the significance of early childhood relationships and reflective capacity in the context of participants’ subsequent experiences in personal therapy.  At the design stage, we could have chosen explicitly to ask participants about the impact of their early attachment experiences on the relationships that they established with their therapists. However, we decided that this was an extremely complex question to ask, and potentially constitutive of the very therapeutic endeavour that many participants were or had until recently been engaged in. Accordingly, we decided to incorporate Adult Attachment Interviews (AAI) (Main and Goldwyn, 1998) alongside our IPA interviews with participants about their experiences in personal therapy.

The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) (Main and Goldwyn, 1998) is a commonly-used qualitative research tool for assessing attachment states of mind that are associated with differing patterns of processing attachment-related thoughts, feelings and memories. It is a semi-structured interview, consisting of a series of questions and probes that are designed to elicit a full story of the interviewee’s early childhood attachment experiences and the impact of these on his or her current functioning. The AAI classification and coding system is based on an assessment of the unconscious strategies individuals use to regulate emotion when discussing attachment-related experiences; classification is thus based not on the content of the childhood memories themselves, nor on the extent to which adults experienced supportive or loving relationships, but rather on narrative discourse markers that are deemed indicative of an underlying representation of and stance towards early childhood attachment experiences. In this way, the AAI scales for coherence of narrative, internal consistency, flexibility, organisation and congruence of affect and content are presumed to index the status and nature of the individual’s unconscious working models of relationships; the specific content of the individual’s own subjective account is considered secondary. Reflective function (RF) (Fonagy and Target, 1996) refers to the automatic capacity to view the self and others as psychological beings, to adopt the ‘intentional stance’ (Dennett, 1987) in interpreting behaviour. It is assumed to be grounded in the quality, status and security of the individual’s early attachment experience. (Fonagy et al, 1991). The Reflective-Self Function Scale (Fonagy et al, 1998), an additional scale for AAI transcripts based on Main’s (1991) notion of metacognitive monitoring, operationalises and assesses the interviewee’s capacity to understand mental states and their readiness to consider these in the self and others. The presence or absence of a reflective stance in relation to self and other is noted and the frequency of these statements are used to score participants on a scale from -1 to 9. 
Whilst it can be seen that the AAI primarily employs qualitative, discourse analytic techniques, AAI classifications and reflective-self function scoring have been used extensively as predictive tools in quantitative research examining the inter-generational transmission of attachment patterns, (Fonagy et al, 1991), responses to psychotherapy in clinical populations (Fonagy et al 1996) and many other studies. In this way, established use of the AAI differs from other discursive methodologies by tending to fall within a positivist tradition, underpinned by a realist ontology that subscribes to the view that attachment categories exist as monolithic, stable constructs, exerting predictable effects on people’s perceptions and behaviour within relationships. Whilst the epistemology underlying AAI assumes we can reveal people’s unconscious relational assumptions by analysing the structure and coherence of their discourse about significant relationships, IPA by contrast privileges the ‘experiential claims and concerns’ (Larkin et al, 2006, p. 104) of the individual, and assumes that what the individual says provides a valid window into his or her internal cognitive world. Importantly, this is not an attempt to access some ‘essence’ of experience as would be expected from a more Husserlian approach, but rather an attempt to access mediated experiences that are filtered through contextual factors and the researcher’s own interpretative activity. The use of AAIs alongside a phenomenological study of participants’ subjective experiences in personal therapy thus provided an interesting juxtaposition of what may be considered epistemologically irreconcilable world views. 

From essentialism to pragmatism.

The presumed opposition between these two competing world views can be taken as an exemplar of what Rorty (1989) has described as ‘alternative vocabularies’ (p. 11). It is worth briefly summarising Rorty’s distinction between truth and reality here. Rorty argues against essentialist or metaphysical philosophies that conflate the existence of an independent ‘truth’ with the existence of an independent reality. Whilst reality is independent of our descriptions of the world, truth, being a description of the world, is ‘mind-dependent’, embedded in the contingencies of a person’s language, vocabulary and culture.  If we assume, however, implicitly, a correspondence theory of truth, then there will always be arguments about which language, which vocabulary, gets closest to that presumed truth, or which most nearly approximates to the ‘thing itself’; in other words, which language is ‘best’ at describing reality. This is an argument taken up by Morgan (2007) who observes an underlying metaphysical paradigm in social science where different assumptions about the nature of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ presuppose, constrain and delimit assumptions both about what can be known and about the most appropriate ways of producing such knowledge. Morgan goes on to ague that the metaphysical stance  - Rorty’s essentialism - sustains what Kuhn (1996) termed the ‘incommensurability’ of different types of knowledge, reducing communication between researchers and limiting practical decisions about the actual conduct of research in the social sciences.

In sidestepping the endemic arguments about which language is ‘best’, Rorty adopts the Wittgensteinian stance that alternative vocabularies should be thought of as more or less efficient tools for dealing with the world rather pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that should either fit together somehow or be jettisoned. This neo-pragmatic perspective, rooted in earlier work by Dewey, Peirce, James and Mead, and adopted by some mixed-methods researchers (eg. Bryman, 2006; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003) opposes a top-down privileging of ontological and epistemological considerations during the decision-making process in research and instead is concerned with the extent to which combining different methodologies can lead to shared meanings and further action; in other words, what the value of such results might be in terms of future behaviour and praxis: 

“Pragmatism asks its usual question "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?"  William James, (1995/1907).





The design of our study included two sets of data, analysed according to separate conventions: Adult Attachment Interviews, analysed and coded according to Main’s (1998) criteria; and the semi-structured personal therapy interviews, analysed according to the principles of IPA suggested by Smith (1995).  ‘Meshing’ or ‘linking’ of the data (Mason, 2006) occurred after data analysis from both interviews was completed. Whilst a detailed outline of the study and its results are available elsewhere (…. 2010) in this paper we only briefly present the study’s design and methodology, and a sample of results. The subsequent discussion focuses on some of the epistemological and practical implications of combining results in this way.

Participants
12 UK counselling psychologists who had been qualified and practising for between three and seven years agreed to participate, including three men and nine women with ages ranging from 35-65. All were white Caucasian with the exception of two participants who were Asian and black Afro-Caribbean. Theoretical orientations of personal therapy were varied and included: psychoanalytic, gestalt, cognitive-behavioural, and existential models. Participants’ clinical work included both NHS and private practice. 

Data collection
Each participant was interviewed twice by the researcher who had been trained in the use of  the AAI: the first interview consisted of the AAI and the subsequent meeting incorporated a semi-structured interview about the participant’s personal therapy. None of the participants had previously undertaken an AAI, though all were broadly familiar with its name. All were informed that the scoring of the AAI would be done by an independent rater, but that participants would be invited to discus results at a future date if they wished. All the AAI interviews were taped and transcribed according the protocol designed by Main (1998) using a Windows XP voice-file.

Most participants were interviewed about their personal therapy one to two weeks after the AAI. The personal therapy interview was conducted according to guidelines offered by Smith (1995) and Smith and Osborn (2003) and covered areas such as: personal and professional background information; experiences during training; personal therapy experiences; personal therapy in clinical practice; and views on the place of personal therapy in current training programmes. Each interview was once again taped and transcribed verbatim using a Windows XP voice-file.





The AAI transcripts were independently analysed by two separate raters, both of whom had been trained and accredited in AAI and reflective-self function coding. Both were highly experienced, and one had been extensively involved in training professionals in the use of Adult Attachment Interviews and Reflective Function scoring. Scoring followed protocols by Main (1998) and Fonagy et al (1998) respectively. All transcripts were rated for inferred parental behaviour and state of mind. 

Within the AAI, the nature of the individual’s attachment representation is indicated by the coherence of his or her discourse during the interview. Grice (1975), a linguistic philosopher, identified coherence as broadly based on co-operative principles, and requiring adherence to the maxims of quality, quantity, relation and manner.  These axioms are incorporated in the AAI rating system where transcripts are assigned to one of four main attachment categories indicative of that individual’s overall state of mind with respect to attachment:

1.	Freely valuing, autonomous or secure with respect to attachment (‘F’). Discourse about attachment-related experiences is coherent, consistent and responses are clear, relevant and succinct.  Speech is frequently in the active voice, and individuals classified as secure demonstrate a capacity to understand that others may have viewpoints different from their own.
2.	Dismissing of attachment (‘D’). Parents or caregivers are described in terms that minimise the importance of attachment experiences. Grice’s maxim of quality is frequently violated, where individuals describe caregivers in highly positive or idealised terms, whilst later contradicting this in later descriptions. The maxim of quantity is also often violated where transcripts are often very brief, usually due to a stated inability to recall early memories. 
3.	Preoccupied with, or entangled by, past attachments (‘E’). Individuals find it difficult to sustain a focus on the interview questions, and discourse demonstrates an angry, passive or confused preoccupation with attachment figures. Interviews are often excessively long, and Grice’s maxims of ‘manner’ and ‘relevance’ are also frequently violated in terms of using unconvincing psychological jargon, and confusing past with current interactions respectively.
4.	Unresolved/disorganised with respect to loss and trauma (‘U’). Individuals show evidence of disorientation during discussion of traumatic events in childhood. Passing lapses in reasoning may be noted along with sudden changes in discourse indicating the existence of incompatible belief and memory systems concerning past traumatic events. Transcripts categorised as unresolved are also given a second best-fit category.





Coding for reflective function followed the procedures in  Fonagy, Target, Steele and Steele (1998). The reflective-function scale has good interjudge reliability (r _ .89) and has been extensively validated in research (see overview in Fonagy et al., 1998). All transcripts were additionally rated and participants’ speech classified according to the following scale:

Negative RF (-1 – 0)
Characterised by: evasive, hostile or incongruent responses to questions; bizarre or inappropriate attributions for behaviour; and overall lack of meaning, lack of explanation and avoidance.  

Lacking in RF (1-2)
Characterised by: predictability; describing mental states in terms of social cliché; failing to reflect mixed emotions; conflict or uncertainty about the beliefs and feelings of others.

Low or questionable RF (3-4)
Characterised by: naïve or simplistic accounts of mental states; alternatively, unintegrated, overly-analytical or hypereflective accounts of attachment experiences. 

Ordinary RF (5-6)
Characterised by: ability to make sense of experience in terms of thoughts and feelings, though not always applied to all aspects of relationships; may not be evident in conflictual or problematic relationships.

Marked RF (7-8).
Characterised by: consistent, detailed awareness of the nature of mental states; explicit attempts to tease out mental states underlying behaviour.

Exceptional RF (9).
Characterised by: exceptional sophistication; complex or elaborate thinking; consistently showing reasoning in a causal way using mental states. 

Combining results from the AAI with the IPA.

A full IPA analysis was undertaken independently of results from the AAIs.  After the IPA was completed, the table of master themes derived from the IPA was colour-coded for attachment status so that the contribution to each theme of each participant x attachment status could be explored (see Tables 2a and 2b). In this way, it was possible retrospectively to re-examine themes in the light of participants’ attachment status and levels of reflective function, and to explore any patterns or features of interest in how participants recalled, described and felt about using their personal therapy in clinical practice.  Table 1 below shows participants’ main attachment classification along with their levels of reflective function. Six were found to be classified as secure/earned-secure, whilst a further six were classified as insecure. As might be expected from the developmental literature, securely-attached participants fell mainly into the ordinary (RF=5-6) or marked (RF= 7-8) range, whilst those given insecure classifications fell mainly into the negative (-1 – 0), lacking (1-2) or low (3-4) range, though there was some overlap.   The possible implications of the high proportion of participants classified as insecurely-attached is discussed elsewhere by Rizq and Target (2010a).

Table 1:  main attachment classifications and reflective function scores.




























We noticed that whilst secure and earned-secure participants in general described their experiences in therapy as beneficial, both professionally and personally, insecurely-attached participants appeared to recall their personal therapy somewhat differently. These participants were more reluctant to attend therapy, and described feeling more resistant, cautious and suspicious of therapists during the period of their therapy. In the sample of results presented below, their accounts are characterised by sometimes intense levels of unease and anxiety about a perceived imbalance of power in the therapeutic relationship and, in contrast to their securely-attached counterparts, most of these participants had felt unable to voice feelings of anger and frustration in therapy; in many cases, they had felt equally unable to leave therapists they found unsafe or unsatisfactory. 

Tables 2a and 2b below illustrate the contribution of each participant to the master–theme of ‘struggling with ambivalent feelings’. This master-theme illustrated how all participants struggled with conflicting feelings towards their therapists, with the issue of the therapist’s expert power and authority in the relationship emerging as an explicit concern. For reasons of space, the following sample of results focuses simply on the final two subthemes: ‘an unequal relationship’ and ‘challenging and changing therapist’.

Table 2: Struggling with ambivalent feelings: secure-earned secure participants.

Master theme 3: Struggling with ambivalent feelings
Name	RF	Disappointment and disillusion	Experiencing the therapist as parent	An unequal relationship	Challenging and changing therapistAvoiding (-) vs confronting (+)
Laura	7	▬	●	▬	  ●(+/-)
Clare	7	●	●	▬	 ● (+)
Sara	3	▬	▬	     ●	● (-)
Judy	5	▬	●	▬	  ●(+/-)



















Table 2b: Struggling with ambivalent feelings: insecurely-attached participants.

Master theme 3: struggling with ambivalent feelings
Name	RF	Disappointment and disillusion	Experiencing the therapist as parent	An unequal relationship	Challenging and changing therapistAvoiding (-) vs confronting (+)
Aida	1.5	▬	▬	●	 ● (-)
Hannah	8	●	● 	●	 ● (-)
Mary	4	▬	▬	●	●(-)
David	2	●	●	●	●(-)





















When results from the IPA were viewed in conjunction with participants’ overall attachment classifications, there seemed to be wide variations in the felt salience of therapeutic power and authority.  Inequality in the therapeutic relationship was raised by all but one of the six insecurely-attached participants who foregrounded the way in which the therapist’s behaviour, therapeutic manner, theoretical orientation or expectations seemed to make them feel small, unequal, or diminished in some way.  Therapeutic power was remembered and described by these insecurely-attached participants in many different ways. At an early stage in her therapeutic training, Hannah wanted to engage in therapy with a Christian therapist, but quickly became uncomfortable with her therapist’s decision to start every session with prayers. The implied divine authority behind such a decision was something she reacted strongly against:

I deliberately chose a Christian because I wanted to see what it would be like to have therapy with a Christian. […] But oh, did I hate it! (ohhh!) It was awful! She was invested with all the sort of authority of God, basically, and she would start the sessions by praying […] which I have to say I would never ever do with a client! So, she prayed, and then we would start. Well, by then, the power imbalance was enormous! 


Similarly, Malcolm appeared to feel pigeon-holed by his psychoanalytic therapist’s authoritative use of labels, and reacted strongly to being described as an ‘oral’ character, even though this was something that he had privately thought of himself. In his account below, it seems as if his therapist is hijacking this self-description and padlocking him into a psychoanalytic model, rather than permitting and exploring more ‘fluid’ explanations:

I’d come to the idea that, you know, I, I had this, this oral side to my character, and then he said it. And for some reason I felt angry. […]when he says it, um, it became, fixed. It, it felt less like a take it or leave it. The, the power of the therapist. And also, the power of the model. Especially…especially, the psychoanalytic model which, which uses far more descriptive terms of the client that any other model I’ve ever come across, in, in being able to put them into boxes. And, the, the danger of course is, is that my fear is that I become fixed. Without seeing it as a very fluid sort of thing as in: ‘mm, there’s a lot of…but this can go up or down’ which is, yeah, which is better’.

Other insecurely-attached participants similarly conveyed an experience of coercion and sensitivity to power that emerged forcefully in their accounts:

‘Now what people have done to me is: ‘do you want to talk about your childhood?’ Full stop! […] that was wrong. Cos I’d say: ‘no. I’m terrified’ […] or ‘I’m embarrassed’. And so there was a lot, a lot of implicit force under these therapies, so I’m very very sensitive to implicit force’ (David).

…we had a constant battle cos she wanted me to go twice a week and I only ever went once a week. (Hannah)

I was still young; I’d been, I wasn’t therapy-wise at the time so, so I wasn’t able to, you know, it was always….struggling against… the, this authority figure, who… had social power to make decisions about me, or descriptions about me that could remain on public record. Um… as if they were facts, when they’re not. (Malcolm)

it was put across, you know, ‘you have to do it; no arguments, you have to do it’. No discussion of, yes, it brings up uncomfortable feelings, let look at it. I didn’t get that from my tutors, didn’t get the sense of  let’s talk about this, yes you have to do it, hey, that’s the given, but let’s look at what, why might you be feeling uncomfortable, (Aida)

We also noticed that, whilst all participants in the study referred to difficulties in challenging and changing their therapists, it was mainly the insecurely-attached participants who tended to avoid discussing or confronting their therapists with their negative feelings. This avoidance appears to have resulted in feelings of hostility, resentment and frustration becoming a significant preoccupation, and participants seemed to find such negative dynamics considerably more problematic and anxiety-provoking than their more securely-attached colleagues, even years after their therapy had finished. This ongoing preoccupation seemed to emerge from a general sense of dissatisfaction with therapy in which feelings of discontent, anxiety or outright anger were felt to have been unacknowledged:  

Maybe that was one of the things I didn’t learn in my own personal therapy, that I had the power to say to my therapist ‘I’m not happy about something’. (Mary)

Several insecurely-attached participants developed various strategies to counteract the power dynamics within the therapeutic relationship. In some cases, this involved dismissing or minimising frustration for fear of invoking the disapproval of a training institution perceived as powerfully influential in a future career; in other cases, participants moved from therapist to therapist rather than confront them with feelings of disappointment and anger. Yet others seemed to retain a satisfying sense of personal power by keeping therapists at a distance and refusing them access to significant emotional material:

bearing in mind that again the motivation was I had to be there for the University, so I remember it being on a very superficial level and holding things back and determined I wasn’t going to let her into personal sort of stuff, (Aida)

By contrast, securely-attached participants appeared to be more confident about addressing negative feelings within the therapeutic relationship. For instance, Anna, whose therapist had applied for a job at her own place of work, was able to challenge and dismiss her therapist. She is robust in her response to what she perceives as her therapist’s utterly inappropriate behaviour:

I said: ‘I don’t think, as you’re applying for this, it’s not appropriate for us to have any further contact. You’ve made it clear where your priorities lie […] so you can just fuck off’. Yeah, well, I didn’t say ‘fuck off’ but that’s what I should have said! 





The brief sample of results above can only give a flavour of how meshing results from the AAIs with themes emerging from the IPA allowed us to explore what personal therapy felt like to participants within the differing attachment classifications. We recognise that this runs the risk of oversimplifying results by omitting a more detailed exploration of the deployment  of specific discourse markers. Indeed, since therapy might reasonably be supposed to activate participants’ working models of care and attachment, one possible research strategy was to examine more closely the particular discourse markers characteristic of the different attachment classifications and to use these same analytic techniques to examine the way in which participants spoke about and experienced their personal therapy.  In the end, we decided against exploring this other than on an informal basis, as we felt that using AAI discourse markers to examine transcripts derived from a separate, albeit related interview, raised significant and complex validity issues beyond the remit of the study. There were also significant ethical concerns about whether to include a complete breakdown of each sub-scale within the AAI and whether to incorporate detailed case analyses examining individual attachment histories in parallel with accounts of personal therapy. In the end, a decision was taken to omit such intimate details, since their inclusion was not only likely seriously to threaten confidentiality, but might also risk pathologising those who had consented to participate in a non-clinical study.  Overall, we felt it more important to explore and comment on any similarities and differences between participants within the primary secure vs insecure categories with respect to their experiences of personal therapy and to use our results to establish possible directions for future research.
From an attachment perspective, we felt that these differences could be conceptualised as the means by which securely or insecurely-attached participants variously regulate the interpersonal distance and dynamics within the therapeutic relationship. However, from a more subjective, phenomenological perspective, participants’ accounts can be viewed as emerging in the context of what appears for some to have felt like a battle, where establishing a position of equality and mutuality – or in some cases a feeling of superiority and control - appeared to be central to participants retaining a sense of identity or personal integrity. For these participants, the experience of therapy in training was dominated by the need to establish and sustain a felt sense of personal power within the therapeutic relationship, rather than simply surrendering control to, or being subjugated by, what they experienced as authoritative – and authoritarian -  therapists. 

This reading of the data is consistent with psychotherapeutic literature that recognises the therapist, like the parent, may come to be perceived as a powerful, authoritative figure in the client’s life.  For those whose childhoods were characterised by neglectful, abusive or absent caregivers, it is likely that actual and symbolic authority figures may evoke working models of relationships that are characterised by feelings of distrust, anger, fear, resistance, or avoidance.  Indeed, whilst not the primary focus of the study, it was clear from the content of participants’ adult attachment narratives that almost all the insecurely-attached individuals had described early relationships that were characterised by fear of violence, intimidation, loss and, in some cases, precocious parenting of mentally ill, abusive or neglectful caregivers; experiences of powerlessness and vulnerability were strikingly prominent.  Unsurprisingly, it was these insecurely-attached participants who were unable to discuss their own attachment-related experience without violating Grice’s conversational maxims in various ways indicative of dismissing, preoccupied or unresolved attachment states of mind. It was also possible to a parallel process occurring in their personal therapy transcripts, where participants not only described relationships with therapists that were in many cases characterised by mistrust, conflict or resentful submission, but their conversation was characterised by discourse markers similar to those identified in the AAI. For example, personal therapy interview transcripts for the two avoidant participants were characterised by their extreme brevity in comparison with other participants, as well as by a lack of detail, whereas the transcript for the preoccupied participant was very long, rather entangled and included a great deal of  rather unconvincing psychological jargon. 

In line with the attachment-related literature (eg. Fonagy et al 1991) we also found that insecurely-attached participants’ RF scores were lower than those of their more securely-attached colleagues. It is therefore possible that not only were insecurely-attached participants more troubled by perceived disparities of power within the therapeutic relationship, but that this entailed serious difficulties in engaging with and constructively using therapy in order to reflect on and so resolve these and other feelings. Those with ordinary or marked levels of RF may not only have been more interested in and therefore more willing to make use of their personal therapy in training to start with, but their higher levels of RF may have meant they were better able to manage and resolve ambivalent feelings arising in the context of power dynamics in a training therapy, thus freeing them to use their therapy productively.  Conversely, those with negative, lacking or low levels of RF may have been less interested in – or even resistant to – gaining self-awareness, resulting in a reduced capacity to tolerate and resolve problematic dynamics in personal therapy. Indeed, it is possible that insecurely-attached participants’ psychological preoccupation with issues of power and authority in personal therapy may have emerged in part at least as a consequence of their generally lower levels of RF, which in some cases seemed to preclude an ability to move beyond such dynamics in order to make effective use of personal therapy. 

Positioning our account within the framework of developmental and attachment-related theory in this way implies that participants’ concern with professional, institutional and interpersonal power dynamics within personal therapy emerged at least in part from their pre-existing working models of relationships. This suggests that insecurely-attached participants may have been sensitised to the symbolic and actual power dynamics within a mandatory personal therapy which then became internally recruited in ways that prevented them from experiencing therapy as useful. This interpretation is certainly consistent with the literature documenting the difficulties in helping insecurely-attached individuals in psychotherapy (Dozier, 1990; Fonagy et al, 1996) and links speculation by Farber and Metzger (2008) that insecure therapists may be less able to repair ruptures to the therapeutic alliance. 

Using attachment theory to interrogate the experiential claims of participants, however, goes to the heart of the interpretative dilemma constitutive of this particular study and to questions regarding the extent to which it could be considered legitimate or helpful to combine, or mesh, results from two differing methods.  Whilst participants’ voices within an IPA are honoured as far as possible in terms of what Ricoeur (1972) calls a ‘hermeneutics of meaning-recollection’, the analysis does not necessarily privilege participants’ own version of events. The researcher may - indeed is quite likely to - provide an account of participants’ experiences that is different, possibly antithetical, to what participants themselves perceive to be the case: what Ricoeur calls a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’. The assumption here, however, is that the researcher’s reflexive analytic account, grounded in his or her own subjectivity, may be one of several, equally justifiable, interpretations of participants’ experiences (though some accounts may be considered more plausible or consistent than others). By contrast, the logic of justification within the realist ontology underpinning the AAI is to privilege the explanatory power of attachment categories derived from a discursive analysis of interviews which in the case of our study may subsequently be used to co-opt the very experiential claims of those same participants describing their personal therapy.  As practising clinicians, our participants’ views certainly evoked strong reactions concerning our own personal – and favourable - experiences of therapy during training. As academics too, our professional backgrounds and preferred forms of psychoanalytic knowledge and experience can be considered as integral to the way in which the study was designed, its themes selected and participants’ material interpreted. However, throughout the study it became increasingly – and uncomfortably - clear that viewing participants’ accounts of therapy through the lens of attachment theory risked replicating and maintaining precisely what some participants strongly resisted within their own training and therapy: the tendency to pathologise and categorise subjective experience within an all-inclusive framework; one that could be seen as situating their accounts within a reductive clinical typology, denuding them of personal meaning and significance. From a methodological perspective then, as well as an ethical one, then, it was important to ensure we honoured the collaborative spirit of qualitative inquiry by offering participants the opportunity to discuss and comment on our interpretations of their material, and that we provided time to provide feedback on what could be regarded as highly sensitive and potentially compromising information concerning their attachment status. Whilst most participants were pleased to offer comment and feedback on the results derived from their personal therapy interviews, it was notable that only one person accepted the invitation to discuss her AAI results, and subsequently spoke about her sense of surprise and relief in thinking about this with someone. 

Of course, I have so far positioned IPA and the AAI as entailing very different ontological and epistemological commitments. In particular, I have located the AAI as largely leaning towards a natural science epistemology, concerned with prediction, control and explanatory validity. By contrast, I have situated IPA within an hermeneutic philosophy concerned with establishing the meanings, intentions and psychological conditions that organise experience. This suggests that there are likely to be difficulties in establishing any kind of internal consistency in a study incorporating two such apparently differing epistemological frameworks. Certainly, given our own immersion in developmental and attachment-related literature, and our experiences of undertaking our own psychoanalytic therapy deploying such discourses, it was extraordinarily difficult to ‘straddle the contradictions’ between the two perspectives in order to privilege neither a psychoanalytic/developmental perspective assuming unconscious ‘reasons’ for participants’ experiences within therapy, nor a face-value reading of respondents’ accounts of their own perceptions of their experience. Part of the struggle we had in managing these difficulties undoubtedly rests with we came to acknowledge as the rather more ambiguous epistemological status of the AAI which can be viewed in both the research and the clinical literature as a semihermeneutic, interpretative methodology as well as an empirical tool with extensive predictive validity. 

Smith (2007) has recently discussed the possibility of extending and developing hermeneutic theory in order to further research in the social sciences. He draws attention to the hermeneutic circle and the dynamic relationship between the part and the whole of the text in question, the importance of a non-linear style of analysis and the ‘good-enough’ interpretation. He also talks about ‘another hermeneutic circle’, (p.5), ie. the relationship between the researcher and the object of research, which he sees as describing the relationship between the interpreter and the object of interpretation: ‘I start where I am at one point on the circle, caught up in my concerns influenced by my preconceptions, shaped by my experience and expertise. In moving from this position, I attempt to either bracket or at least acknowledge my preconceptions before I go round to an encounter with the research participant at the other side of the circle……Having concluded the conversation, I continue the journey round the circle back to where I started. So I return home to analyse the material I collected from the perspective I started from, influenced by my prior conception and experience. However, I am also irretrievably changed because of the encounter with the new, my participant and his/her account’ (p. 6).

Main (1995) has noted that ‘the methodology and findings surrounding the AAI stand in a complex and somewhat ironic relation to hermeneutics….’ (p. 238). To understand this statement, we need to go back to the early development of the AAI which emerged from a sample of transcripts of parents whose infants had been assessed five years previously  in Ainsworth’s experimental ‘strange situation procedure’. These infants were all originally assigned an attachment category based on their behaviour at reunion with mother after a series of very brief separations. The subsequent parental AAI transcripts were rated on the basis of discourse markers in the text that led Main to hypothesise about the speaker’s state of mind with respect to attachment as expressed in their original caregiving behaviour. Each hypothesis was then tested by comparing it to the infant’s earlier response to the parent in the strange situation procedure. Corrections to each hypothesis were made and refined until, eventually, a rule system for determining responses to the AAI for parents with infants from each category was established.  

Main (1995) has suggested that, in this process of developing of the Adult Attachment Interview, the hermeneutic circle has been broadened, this time by stepping ‘outside the text’ (p.239) to find consistency with infant behaviour observed several years previously in a totally different context. ‘What was considered informative in furthering our understanding of the text was not simply existing relations between parts of the text, but behaviour that was externally correspondent’ (p. 239). A strict hermeneutic point of view (one that is also consonant with the methodology of IPA), suggests that there is, as it were, nothing beyond the text; but Main’s development of the AAI suggest that accounts of early attachment-related experience do point to something beyond the text - something external and predictable that helps us to understand the meaning of the text in terms of the individual’s mental representation of attachment that has sponsored their actual caregiving behaviour. This of course represents a dovetailing of the hermeneutic perspective with one closer to the concerns of natural science – hypothesis-testing, replication and verification. 





The legitimacy of ‘stepping outside the text’ of course is an issue relating to concerns about validity issues in mixed-methodology research. Whilst these are currently receiving some attention in the literature (eg. Dellinger and Leech, 2007; Miller, 2003; Burke Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004) there is, as yet, little consensus and much controversy about what might define or constitute an appropriate set of criteria for establishing validity in research involving multiple methodologies and epistemologies. These debates, which may be taken as further instances of the difficulty in ‘straddling the contradictions’ thrown up by researchers working within the mixed-methods paradigm, return us to Rorty’s (1989) suggestion that rather than try to establish the ‘truth’ of a particular language or perspective, we should be asking about its ‘cash value’: what it enables us to do or think about that we couldn’t do or think about before.

Greenwood and Levin (2005), arguing from a similarly pragmatic perspective, point out that:

Validity . . . [is] measured by the willingness of local stakeholders to act on the results . . . thereby risking their welfare on the ‘‘validity’’ of their ideas and the degree to which the outcomes meet their expectations. Thus, cogenerated contextual knowledge is deemed valid if it generates warrants for action. The core validity claim centers on the workability of the actual social change activity engaged in, and the test is whether or not the actual solution to a problem arrived at solves the problem. (p. 54)





The purpose of this paper has to a large degree been to highlight and engage with some of the issues and creative tensions that emerge when we combine differing qualitative methodologies and try to refrain from falling into the essentialist position that assumes that one or the other provides the authoritative version, the truth-bearing language, the ur-text. Indeed, given the current proliferation of differing methodologies and the growing acceptance of pluralism in social science (Morgan, 2007) I suggest that an ability to compare, contrast, mesh and link diverse epistemologies and methodologies is increasingly likely to become the desirable ‘cultural competency’ (Ponterrotto and Grieger, 1999) for the contemporary social science researcher.  Rather than remaining in our various methodological comfort zones, instead of remaining trapped in or limited by our epistemological vocabularies, we need to develop the ability to speak other languages, not only in order to communicate meaningfully with other researchers, but also to better compare and adjudicate the uses to which these competing discourses are put.  

With hindsight, perhaps it is no co-incidence that I started this paper with a quotation from William Empson. As Rorty (1989) points out, literary criticism is not these days much concerned with evaluating books against some independent measure or standard of literary merit; critics such as Arnold, Trilling, and more latterly Sontag and Kermode have been far more interested to compare and contrast different writers, or to place particular novels and authors in the context of other novels or different authors. In this way, Rorty argues, we look to critics as people who, by virtue of their extensive acquaintance with differing literary traditions and cultures, are able to inform our understanding of and empathic identification with as wide a range of different people as possible.  

There is surely a rich seam of philosophy to dig here, albeit one that is deserving of more space than I am able to give in this paper. For now I would tentatively like to propose the literary critic as an illuminating, if provocative model for the social science researcher who, by widening his or her acquaintance with different methodologies and epistemologies, by expanding his or her investigative lexicon, may similarly be able to bring as rich and diverse an understanding as possible to the phenomena under examination. As Spezzano (1999) points out, such a lexicon can only be forged in the dialogue and discussions we have with other researchers who are similarly engaged.  He suggests: 

‘…the only way we have of determining that we are coming closer to, or moving away from, the truth in any scholarly effort, is by agreement or lack of agreement with other members of the dialogical community within which the conversation has taken place. It may appear that, in some instances, an experiment has established the truth, but that is never the case. Every report of an experiment contains an invitation by the author to others in that field to talk about what he has observed or measured, It never contains only observations or measurements but always also contains a discussion in which the author can be heard to ask others: ‘Here is what I observed, and here is what I have made of it. Wouldn’t you agree?’ (p. 451)
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